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Discussant's Response to 
The Evolution of Audit Reporting 
J. Alex Milburn 
Clarkson Gordon, Toronto 
I read this paper, and then sat back and thought about how to go about 
commenting on it. I had to recognize that I faced some formidable disadvan-
tages. First, the subject of the paper is the evolution of audit reporting in the 
United States—and I am an accountant from a remote foreign land. Second, the 
authors could not be more knowledgeable on the subject. Doug Carmichael, in 
particular, has been part of this evolution for quite some time. Who could know 
better than the authors how the audit report has evolved? I can hardly 
challenge their facts and they are clearly in a much better position than I to 
interpret these facts. 
Buoyed up by these thoughts, I began by asking myself some basic first 
principle kinds of questions—like what am I doing here? I thought about 
questioning the purposes of tracing this evolution in the first place. What is the 
interest in it? What good can come of it? Perhaps I can set up some ideal 
purposes that the paper cannot meet. Certainly, I need some basis for judging 
whether this is a good evolution evaluation or not. Otherwise it is like trying to 
judge "presents fairly" without " G A A P . " 
Naturally, I turned to the FASB conceptual framework. (This is the beauty 
of this developing framework—everything can be explained by it.) I think there 
is some application of the FASB framework to this paper. In particular, I 
presume that the paper attempts to present historical information in a way that 
will help us evaluate the profession's past performance and future prospects. 
Perhaps the paper's usefulness should be judged in terms of whether it helps 
us to see what audit reporting may be evolving towards, and in terms of 
whether it improves our basis for making decisions as to desirable future 
efforts towards improving reporting standards. So we might ask whether this 
paper is useful in this sense. 
As I thought more about this, another basic question occurred to me—what 
are the authors really trying to demonstrate here? Is there a hidden agenda? I 
get the impression of a feeling of a little frustration, and perhaps a touch of 
bewilderment, on the part of the authors. A basic message in the paper is that 
there have been no significant improvement changes in the audit report in 33 
years and that to them "a crucial question is why" (p. 1). They cite significant 
evidence of misunderstanding of the audit report going back to the mid 
1960's—and they describe two major attempts at revision since then that have 
failed. Thus, they raise some serious concerns. 
Focus of the Paper 
I think it very important to identify the focus of this paper because I am 
going to argue that it is too narrow. The authors have concentrated on the 
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annual financial statement audit report. Their primary measure of progress 
seems to be improvement changes in the wording of this audit report. They 
trace the evolution from the undefined, diverse practices of the early 1900's 
through various stages, which might be summed up as follows: 
• Progress in defining and developing audit standards for an engage-
ment—which came to be symbolized by the phrase "generally 
accepted auditing standards" (GAAS). 
• Steps towards trying to clarify the accounting basis for the financial 
statements within the evolving concept of "generally accepted 
accounting principles" (GAAP). 
• Gradual specification of distinguishable reporting sub-types to cover 
all possible signals that the auditor should give with respect to an 
engagement—the unqualified opinion, types of qualified opinions, the 
disclaimer of opinion and the adverse opinion. 
In other words, the authors trace a process of definition, improvement of 
concepts, standardization, solidification. 
To me it is not too surprising to find that changes in the audit report took 
place more quickly in earlier years, as the engagement itself was in the process 
of being developed, and that increasing resistance to change arose as auditing 
matured—became set in terms of legal requirements, precedents and profes-
sional rules. 
Within the framework chosen (the annual financial statement audit engage-
ment) I find the paper well done and interesting. I think it instructive and most 
useful to have the knowledgeable and experienced perspective on events that 
Doug Carmichael and Alan Winters bring to it. 
A Broader Perspective 
However, I suggest that the authors take too narrow a perspective of 
"audit reporting." I will try to demonstrate that, had they taken a broader 
view of audit reporting and its evolution, they would have ended up with a very 
different and, I think, a more useful perspective on past events and future 
prospects and opportunities. 
When I saw the title "The Evolution of Audit Reporting,'' I expected the 
paper would deal with all forms of attest reporting, rather than only the financial 
statement audit. I presume, though, that the authors' orientation was valid in 
the beginning—that the audit of annual financial statements was, in the early 
stages of this evolution, the basic, if not sole, mission of the auditor. But audit 
reporting began to evolve beyond this one engagement some time ago. 
In fact, the paper does mention some evidence of this broadening. In my 
view a key point in their analysis is Landmark VII. Its primary focus is the 
1961-2 defining of the adverse opinion in SAP 32. The authors note in passing, 
though, that the SAP also discussed unaudited statements, piecemeal opinions 
and negative assurance. They end up their discussion of this Landmark by 
pointing out that a "trend has continued to develop in the reporting guidelines 
for limited assurance engagements." But they relegated this to a passing 
reference and did not follow it up. 
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I suggest that in passing by this area they have ignored evidence of the 
formal beginnings of a major development in audit reporting. Some important 
things began to come together in the early to mid 1960's. Perhaps the impetus 
was the growing consumerism which was becoming evident then—and that this 
resulted in pressures for increased accountability by corporate entities to a 
wider public. In any event, there began to be pressures for public companies to 
provide information beyond annual financial statements for various user 
purposes. With this came commensurate pressures upon the public accounting 
profession to provide some degree of independent assurance on certain of this 
information. As pointed out by the Cohen Commission Report, the profession 
first reacted cautiously and negatively to any expansion of the auditor's role-
viewing any association with other than a GAAS financial statement audit as 
fraught with dangers for user misunderstanding and legal liability. (This 
negativism is in contrast with the authors' general finding that the profession's 
financial statement audit reporting tended to lead practice developments.) The 
profession had good reason for concern in the US, as these were litigious 
times. But despite this negative professional reaction, important changes 
began to take place. At first these took ad hoc, diverse and somewhat 
inconsistent forms, just as with the early editions of the financial statement 
audit report. But this evolution has recently been taking a more comprehensive 
general shape. 
Some Evolutionary Developments 
Let me cite some evidence of this wider evolution by reference to the then 
emerging reporting approach referred to as "negative assurance." As far as I 
can see, the concept of "negative assurance" reporting was first given official 
recognition in the early to mid 1960's in the narrowly defined context of the 
"comfort letter" for underwriters on unaudited financial information and 
statistical data in prospectuses. This, and similar reporting forms, soon began 
to spread to other areas. Three examples: 
• Published interim financial information. (The evolution of professional 
reporting in this area is a particularly interesting one. It first emerged 
as a public issue in 1974 when Coopers & Lybrand stepped forward 
and proposed that auditors should be willing, subject to certain 
conditions, to provide limited assurance to shareholders on published 
interim statements. The reactions throughout the rest of the profes-
sion were so adverse that Coopers & Lybrand had to withdraw their 
proposal, but look where we have evolved to since then!*) 
• So-called "special reports" providing limited assurance on specified 
items of financial information, and on compliance with contractual, 
statutory or regulatory requirements (given recognition by SAS 14). 
• Most recently, the development of a "review" engagement to 
provide limited assurance on the financial statements of nonpublic 
entities (in Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review 
Services No. 1, December 1978). 
* I traced the evolution of this, and other limited assurance reporting practices, to 1980 in Canada 
and the US in Limited Audit Engagements and the Expression of Negative Assurance (Toronto: The 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants), Chapters 2-7. 
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What were expressions of negative assurance trying to accomplish? I 
suggest that they were the results of a groping by public accountants in 
practice for a reporting response to situations where there seemed to be a 
legitimate need for some useful degree of assurance, but where a full GAAS 
audit was just not possible or was not practicable from a reasonable cost/ 
benefit viewpoint. 
There are many examples of continuing pressures to broaden the audit 
function beyond GAAP financial statements and a full GAAS audit—including 
reports on internal control systems, assurance on the whole published annual 
report, on forecasts, on supplementary oil reserve information, current cost 
data, etc., etc. 
I suggest that this broader perspective has some potentially interesting 
implications for the evolution of audit reporting: 
• I suggest that these developments expose a broader attest function 
than the traditional financial statement GAAS perspective has allowed 
us to see. Attest assurance may be defined in terms of adding a 
degree of confidence that there are no material errors in a specified 
representation (whether it be financial statements, or whatever). 
This suggests that, conceptually, there is a continuum of possible 
degrees of audit confidence ranging between one extreme of no 
confidence whatsoever, to the other theoretical extreme of 100% 
confidence that the particular representation is what it purports to be. 
The traditional GAAS financial statement audit is a section of this 
continuum, somewhere towards the upper end of the scale. In one 
sense what has been evolving is the whole area below this GAAS 
audit—the reporting of limited attest assurance. Underlying concepts 
and standards in evolution deal with (1) appropriate minimum attest 
effort for different types of situations, (2) user acceptance of the risks 
of undetected errors in those efforts, and (3) effective communication 
of the assurance which results. 
• From this perspective, I think it becomes apparent that "generally 
accepted auditing standards"—which had been developed as the basic 
general attest standards—are incomplete and inadequate.* 
In short, I suggest that this broader perspective strongly points to the need to 
broaden our attest standards—that the so-called "generally accepted auditing 
standards" are really a subset representing only one, albeit important, type of 
attest engagement. 
I introduce all this to try to support a basic point—that when the authors 
implicitly assume audit reporting to be the GAAS audits of annual financial 
statements, they lose, in my opinion, a significant aspect of the recent 
evolution of audit reporting. They end up seeing a world in which there is little 
apparent change, because they are focusing on one fairly mature engagement. 
Words and Communication 
But suppose we accept the approach of this paper—and it is certainly 
legitimate, and potentially very useful, to trace the evolution of the audit report 
* For one suggestion as to the direction in which attest standards should be evolving, see the 
aforementioned CICA Research Study Limited Audit Assurance and the Expression of Negative 
Assurance. 
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on the GAAS audit of annual financial statements. I still have some concern with 
the narrowness of their perspective within this approach. There would seem to be 
some belief, not only by the authors but by the auditing profession in general, that 
the auditor's report is the sole medium of communication with financial statement 
users. If one believes this, it would seem to follow that it is essential to try to 
perfect the words in that report, and that progress in audit reporting lies in 
improving that wording. On the other hand, if one accepts that the report is 
basically a symbol (a symbol of a GAAS level of auditor involvement to arrive at 
a "positive opinion" level of assurance that the information accords with 
GAAP), then one might be less concerned with the exact wording of the 
report. Certainly it would be nice to get rid of words that may have different 
layman's usage than the meaning intended by the profession—for example, the 
word "fairly." Also, it would be nice if we could make more explicit the 
independence of the auditor, the pervasiveness of judgment, and the respon-
sibilities of management for the reported information. However, it may be 
argued that the words themselves become less important if 
1. The reporting symbol is recognizable as representing a particular 
(GAAS) level of audit effort and auditor standards, and a particular 
financial statement representation based on GAAP; and 
2. The underlying standards are defensible and defined in a form that 
reasonable users have access to and can be expected to be able to 
understand. 
(Perhaps some might even argue that these objectives could be met with the 
reporting symbol being a number or a colour, i.e., without any words.) If one 
accepts this reasoning, then the prime responsibilities of the auditing profes-
sion become more oriented towards ensuring that: 
• Attest standards are defensible and adequately defined, and 
• Reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that adequate informa-
tion is available to users on these standards and underlying concepts. 
What I am suggesting then is that perhaps the authors are too preoccupied 
with the wording changes in the report. I say "perhaps," because, in fact, the 
paper is not solely preoccupied with report wording. It notes, for example, as 
Landmark IX, that in 1975 standard setters took the step of clarifying 
"presents fairly in accordance with GAAP" in SAS No. 5 instead of trying to 
change the words in the report. 
The authors note the resistance to changing the standard form of wording 
of the auditor's report, and speculate as to what the reasons may be for this 
resistance. I suspect that they are right in suggesting that once the reporting 
form became reasonably set (i.e. became a symbol), attempts to change it have 
tended to be viewed as attempts to change the meaning of the symbol (what it 
is signalling), even if this was not intended. 
We cannot ignore some very important concerns that the authors raise 
about the understandability of the standard financial statement audit report. 
They point to the Cohen Commission and other sources of evidence that the 
standard financial statement audit report is misunderstood. But I think there 
are at least three possible reasons for this misunderstanding that report 
wording is not going to help. 
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1. Users may not have done their homework. 
2. The standards underlying the engagement may be uncertain, illogical 
or contradictory. 
3. The profession may not have taken adequate steps to educate its 
public. 
To the extent that the latter is the case, I suggest that it is unrealistic for the 
profession to try to educate the public basically by making changes in the short 
form report. In my view, there is just no way that a two-paragraph report can 
serve as the sole means of communication with users—that it can adequately 
portray such subtleties as judgment in the auditing process, the concept of 
"fairness" within GAAP, or the responsibility of management for financial 
information. One must look to the underlying body of standards and practices 
underlying an engagement to understand these things. 
In short, I suggest that we need to have a wider view of audit reporting 
communication. Further, I suggest that the paper evidences some significant 
developments within the past 33 years, basically in the area of improving and 
codifying auditing standards and generally accepted accounting principles. But I 
also suggest that a broader analysis that gets away from preoccupation with the 
wording exposes deficiencies on the part of the profession in communicating its 
standards to its user public, and in educating the public to understand its 
reporting symbols. 
Summary 
In summary, the paper seems to this Canadian to do a good job of tracing 
the evolution of the annual financial statement audit report within the param-
eters that the authors have assumed. But I think that this is too narrow a focus 
within which to view the evolution of audit reporting generally—that we need to 
stand back and look at audit reporting within a larger system that includes other 
degrees of assurance and other representations, or we miss much of what has 
been happening, and the broader implications of this for the future. 
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